

## Message Text

MRN: 1977QUITO 000101 SEGMENT NUMBER: 000001 ERROR READING TEXT INDEX

FILE; TELEGRAM TEXT FOR THIS SEGMENT IS UNAVAILABLE

ADP251

SECRET

PAGE 01 QUITO 00101 02 OF 03 061313Z

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

-----061315Z 091451 /44

O P 061128Z JAN 77

FM AMEMBASSY QUITO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2757

INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY CARACAS PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY LIMA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 QUITO 0101

EXDIS

FOR DELIVERY OPENING OF BUSINESS JAN 6

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMAN

6. NOR IS THERE ANY REALISTIC THREAT FROM ECUADOR RE-QUIRING PERU TO COUNTER WITH SUCH CONCENTRATION OF FORCE. WHILE SOME HOT-HEADED MID AND JUNIOR-LEVEL OFFICERS HERE HAVE ADVOCATED TAKING ADVANTAGE OF A PERU-CHILE CONFLICT TO RECOVER LOST TERRITORIES, POLICY-LEVEL OFFICERS ALL RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE DOOMED TO FAILURE. THEY ARE APPARENTLY MORE SANGUINE, HOWEVER, ABOUT THEIR ABILITY TO REPEL A PERUVIAN THRUST THAN INDICATED BY THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

7. GIVEN THE ABOVE BACKGROUND, WE SEE TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS: FIRST, SHOULD WE ATTEMPT TO REASSURE THE GOE WITH REGARD TO THEIR LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS AND THUS REDUCE THE RISK THAT SOME FUTURE PERUVIAN PROVOCATION WILL TRIGGER A PANICKY ECUADOREAN REACTION LEADING TO A CONFLICT;

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 QUITO 00101 02 OF 03 061313Z

AND, SECOND, HOW DO WE DEAL WITH THE LARGER PROBLEM OF THE INCREASING LIKELIHOOD OF WAR IN THE REGION OVER THE COMING MONTHS AND YEARS? OUR BASIC STAKE IN THIS SITUATION DERIVES FROM A GENERAL INDISPOSITION TO SEE ARMED CONFLICT

BECOME PREVALENT AMONG COUNTRIES IN THIS HEMISPHERE.

IN MY VIEW, THE US HAS AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AS A PRINCIPAL GOAL THE PROMOTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER WHICH DISCOURAGES LOCAL OR REGIONAL WARS AND RESTORES PEACE QUICKLY IF THEY DO BREAK OUT. THIS IS BECAUSE:

(1) THERE ARE ALWAYS STRONG PRESSURES FOR THE US TO BECOME INVOLVED UNILATERALLY, ESPECIALLY IF THE USSR OR ITS ALLIES ALREADY ARE; (2) SUCH CONFLICTS OFTEN AFFECT OTHER US INTERESTS, ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN, AND POLITICAL; (3) SUCH CONFLICTS CAN EXACERBATE DIFFERENCES AND DIVISIONS WITHIN OUR OWN SOCIETY. IT FOLLOWS THAT IN A REGION WHERE PEACE HAS BEEN THE RULE FOR MOST OF RECENT HISTORY, WE HAVE A PARTICULAR INTEREST IN PRESERVING THE GAINS ALREADY ACHIEVED TOWARD SUCH A UNIVERSAL GOAL. MOREOVER, THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES FOR US INVOLVEMENT ARE GREATER IN THIS REGION THAN IN ANY OTHER EXCEPT WESTERN EUROPE, GIVEN TRADITIONAL AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT "OUR BACKYARD."

8. AT THE SAME TIME, WE ARE FACED WITH A SITUATION IN WHICH THE CONDITIONS WHICH PROMOTED PEACE AMONG THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NATIONS ARE CHANGING. SINCE THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM CAME INTO BEING IN THE LATE FORTIES, I CAN RECALL ONLY TWO CONFLICTS WHERE ARMIES OF ANY TWO OF THE MEMBERS CLASHED FORMALLY -- AND THIS IS AN AREA WHERE MILITARY REGIMES ARE THE RULE RATHER THAN THE EXCEPTION AND DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF DOZENS OF UNRESOLVED BOUNDARY ISSUES. ALTHOUGH THE MINIMUM AMOUNT OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT IN THE AREA MIGHT BE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE GOOD SENSE OF ITS HABITUDES, I STRONGLY SUSPECT THAT THE REAL REASON HAS BEEN THE IMPLIED MUSCLE THAT THE US HAS SUPPLIED TO THE OAS PEACE-KEEPING ROLE. THOSE WHO MIGHT HAVE CONSIDERED RESOLVING TERRITORIAL DISPUTES OR OTHER ISSUES BY FORCE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 QUITO 00101 02 OF 03 061313Z

OF ARMS HAVE ALWAYS HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE EFFECT OF SUCH ACTION ON BOTH THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER OAS MEMBERS ENERGIZED AND LED BY THE US. IN RECENT YEARS, HOWEVER, UNILATERAL US ACTION TO INTERVENE IN LOCAL CONFLICTS HAS BECOME LESS AND LESS ACCEPTABLE TO OUR PEOPLE AND TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, FOR REASONS THAT ARE FAMILIAR TO US ALL.

9. THUS WHAT IS MOST ALARMING ABOUT WHAT PERU'S INTENTIONS -- WHETHER IN THE SHORT-RUN OR OVER THE LONGER-TERM -- MIGHT BE IS ITS APPARENT DISREGARD FOR THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE DISDAIN WITH WHICH IT SEEMS TO HAVE DISCOUNTED THE REACTION OF THE US. FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 30 YEARS WE SEEM TO BE FACED WITH A DEVELOPING CRISIS WHICH IS BEING PRECIPITATED NOT BY A SERIES OF ACCIDENTS AND ESCALATING RESPONSES, BUT BY A COLD AND CALCULATED PROJECTION OF MILITARY FORCE FOR THE NARROWEST OF NATIONALIST AND IRREDENTIST MOTIVES.

THE PERUVIAN ARMS BUILD-UP, GIVEN ITS HISTORICAL PROBLEMS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, REPRESENTS IN ITS LONGER-RUN PROJECTION A CLEAR AND DIRECT CHALLENGE TO THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND TO THE TRADITIONAL US UNDERWRITER ROLE IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HEMISPHERIC PEACE. SHOULD THE ENTERPRISE SUCCEED, OTHERS SIMILAR IN NATURE MAY FOLLOW. WHAT WE ARE FACED WITH THEN IN THIS PROBLEM IS THE THREAT OF THE BEGINNING OF THE UNRAVELLING OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF REPLACING IT WITH NEO-DARWINIAN NOTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE US HEGEMONY WHICH BACKED-UP THE SYSTEM'S PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITY IS FADING FAST, AT LEAST FROM THE SOUTH AMERICAN CONTINENT. AS I TRIED TO POINT OUT IN QUITO 8937, THE TRADITIONAL ULTIMATE THREAT -- ARMED INTERVENTION BY THE US -- IS NO LONGER CREDIBLE, AND WHILE I DON'T AGREE WITH JOHN CRIMMINS THAT ECONOMIC SACTIONS ARE ALSO NOT FEASIBLE (WE'VE BEEN WILLING TO TRY THEM OFTEN ENOUGH IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES) I DO AGREE THAT THEY WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT UNILATERALLY WITH A DEGREE OF INTENSITY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 QUITO 00101 02 OF 03 061313Z

NECESSARY TO HAVE A REAL EFFECT.

10. HENCE WE ARE LEFT WITH A MECHANISM FOR MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY THAT IS NO LONGER SIMPLY A FIG-LEAF FOR US POWER, NEVERTHELESS, I ENDORSE THE APPROACH RECOMMENDED BY JOHN CRIMMINS: THAT OF STIMULATING A MULTILATERAL EFFORT. IT IS FAR PREFERABLE, EVEN IF ITS SUCCESS IS PROBLEMATICAL, TO DOING NOTHING. WHILE SHARING HIS CONCERN THAT SUCH AN EFFORT ULTIMATELY BE PLACED UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, I AGREE THAT SOME MORE INTIMATE FORUM MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE AT LEAST AT EARLY STAGES. FORTUNATELY, THE VERY LOCATION OF THE TENSION GIVES A FINE HOOK ON WHICH TO HANG SUCH AN EFFORT: IT IS AN ANDEAN PROBLEM WHOSE RESOLUTION SHOULD BE INITIATED BY ANDEAN STATES (I ASSUME THAT CHILE STILL RETAINS TIES TO AND CONSIDERS ITSELF AN ANDEAN COUNTRY). THUS COLOMBIA AND VENEZUELA WOULD BE CENTRAL TO THE EFFORT, AND OUR ATTEMPTS TO ENERGIZE IT SHOULD FOCUS ON THEM. I THINK BOTH BRAZIL AND ARGENTINA HAVE VALID ROLES TO PLAY. I DO SHARE WITH JOHN CONCERN OVER THE PROPER ROLE FOR BRAZIL GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS ARE ALL SENSITIVE TO REAL OR IMAGINED BRAZILIAN AMBITIONS IN THE REGION. ARGENTINA IS SIGNIFICANT BECAUSE OF THE SPECIAL TIES IT HAS WITH BOLIVIA AND IS CREATING WITH CHILE.

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MRN: 1977QUITO 000101 SEGMENT NUMBER: 000003 ERROR READING TEXT INDEX

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Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009